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Abstract 
Intergovernmental transfers are susceptible to the tactical influence of the transfer-giving 
government notwithstanding the institution of a formula-based system under the control of an 
independent institutional body. This study explores the arrangement of intergovernmental 
transfers in Nigeria, where the formula-based system under the control of a constitutionally 
recognised body is in place, using the data from the year 2007 to the year 2016. The general 
conclusion from this study does not support equity considerations but rather tactical 
manipulation in intergovernmental transfers. Results suggest that states with poor fiscal 
capacity, especially the rural and less developed states, receive lower transfers per capita, 
contrary to equity considerations. There is evidence that transfers to states under the control of 
opposition parties and term-limited governors are lower. Additionally, transfers are strategically 
increased to all states during election periods possibly for the federal government’s political 
base enlargement and strengthening.  
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1. Introduction 
Intergovernmental relations engender a cooperative system in governance which entails 
responsibilities and resources sharing. Normative theories of intergovernmental transfers of the 
Arrow-Musgrave-Samuelson1 (AMS) tradition dictate that transfers should be determined on 
the bases of equity and efficiency for even provision of public services and development across 
the subnational geopolitical space in a federation (Musgrave, 1999; Oates, 1972, 1999, 2005). 
However, there is a growing literature showing that intergovernmental transfers are laced with 
political considerations and susceptible to a political instrument in the hands of the central 
government. This happens especially where transfers are discretionary and/or form the bulk of 
revenues of the subnational governments. To stem this anomaly, two institutional mechanisms 
have been designed: the establishment of formulae for allocation of intergovernmental 
transfers, and the establishment and delegation of distribution of transfers to independent 
agencies (Khemani, 2007). Even so, the manipulation of transfer-receiving governments for 
political gains by the transfer-giving governments is evident in many countries (Boex & Martinez-
Vazquez, 2005).  
This study is the first to explore the Nigerian specific peculiarities under the formula-
based revenue-sharing arrangement between the federal and subnational governments. 
Although the extant practice in Nigeria conforms to the formula-based approach, it may not be 
completely free of opportunism and targeting as the institutional body’s executives are 
appointees of the president. Additionally, the existence and acceptance of a formula are based 
on a political equilibrium that exists at a particular time which may give way to another formula 
in the face of a new political development. In realisation of the above facts and the lack of a 
detailed country-specific study on Nigeria, this study explores the political economy of 
intergovernmental transfers in Nigeria.  
                                               
1 See Oates (2005) for a detailed discussion of this view. 
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Our study is important for several reasons. First, although there is a growing literature 
on the politics of intergovernmental transfers, the number of studies focusing on developing 
countries, particularly from Africa, is very limited. As far as we know, only the cases of Ghana, 
Senegal and Tanzania have been analyzed (Allers & Ishemoi, 2011; Banful, 2011, Caldeira, 2012). 
Thus, Nigeria being the most populous and a leading economy in Africa with its constitutional 
federalism needs to be studied. Secondly, the Nigerian environment presents an interesting case 
given the moral hazard and tax exporting issues occasioned by attempts to balance development 
across the subnational political space through intergovernmental transfers. Besides, this study 
discusses the peculiarities of the Nigerian federalism that make distributive politics inherent in 
intergovernmental transfers. The political developments and ethnic rivalry lay emphasis on 
equality in revenue sharing at a horizontal level. This does not reflect the developmental needs 
of constituent units of the federation. In particular, equality determines the largest chunk of 
what goes to states from the distributable revenues despite differences in the rate of 
urbanisation and the need to fund developmental projects to cope with the urbanisation.  
Our empirical results suggest intergovernmental transfers are not allocated based on 
equity and efficiency. There exists political targeting in the formula-based intergovernmental 
system in Nigeria. Intergovernmental transfers are strategically used to enlarge the political base 
and guarantee the reelection of the government at the center. The study shows that rural and 
agrarian states receive lower transfers. Besides, states including mineral-producing states under 
the control of the opposition governments and term-limited governors are penalized in 
allocation of transfers, but transfers are generally increased to states around election periods. 
While, mineral-producing states are specially treated, possibly for their credible threat of 
secession.  
The study is organised as follows. The following section presents the literature review. 
Section three focuses on intergovernmental transfers in Nigeria and its institutional foundation. 
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Section four discusses the methodology. Section five presents empirical results. Finally, section 
six concludes the paper.  
 
2. Literature Review 
The normative theory of revenue allocation among tiers of governments in a multi-level 
governance structure emphasises equity and efficiency in determining how much is granted to 
the various levels of government vis-à-vis their responsibilities. In this view governments are 
social planners maximizing the welfare of the people at each jurisdiction. However, political 
motives may interfere in the allocation process. Thus, policies are crafted for votes as politicians 
are profit maximising agents, like entrepreneurs selling products for money (Downs, 1957). Two 
strands of models have been developed to explain how incumbent politicians use 
intergovernmental transfers to promote their probability of re-election at the pools: the political 
budget cycle models, and the tactical redistribution models.  
Political budget cycle (PBC) models (Rogoff & Sibert, 1988; Rogoff, 1990) assume that 
the incumbent officeholder knows his level of competence better than the electorates. Rogoff 
and Sibert (1988) posit that competency is the ability to provide a given level of government 
services with less revenue. Given the temporary information asymmetry, when facing an 
election, the incumbent has an incentive to take advantage of voters by signalling competence 
through a reduction in taxes. Taxes are immediately visible by voters while any error by the 
government is observed with a lag through a distorting seigniorage tax or a deficit.2 Rogoff 
                                               
2 The political budget cycle models of Rogoff and Sibert (1988) and Rogoff (1990) focus on fiscal policy and 
assume voters’ expectations are rational. These models were inspired by Nordhaus (1975) that pioneered 
the literature on political business cycles. Nordhaus (1975) was the first to admit that macroeconomic 
variables are influenced by opportunistic electoral motivations. Assuming that governments care only 
about their re-election prospects and that voters’ expectation are adaptive, governments can exploit the 
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(1990) proposes a similar model in which the incumbent officeholder has an incentive to bias 
public expenditures in favour of current consumption expenditures and delays public 
investment. More recently, alternative models of political budget cycles (Shi & Svensson, 2006; 
Alt & Lassen, 2006) have been developed where all politicians, regardless of their competence, 
have an incentive to manipulate fiscal policy to signal competence and win elections. The 
literature on PBC has also shown that the electoral budget cycle is a positive function of the 
political rents of the incumbent (Shi & Svensson, 2006) and negatively related with the share of 
informed voters (Shi & Svensson, 2006) and transparency (Alt & Lassen, 2006). There is also 
evidence that they are stronger in young democracies (Brender & Drazen, 2005; Shi & Svensson, 
2006) and less salient in the presence of term limits (Aidt & Shvets, 2012; Veiga & Veiga, 2019).  
The literature on tactical redistribution is spearheaded by Cox and McCubbins (1986), 
and Lindbeck and Weibull (1987). Cox and McCubbins (1986) view electoral politics as a 
redistributive game in which electoral candidates plan welfare redistributive programs among 
groups in their constituency for political gains. They contend that risk-averse candidates invest 
relatively more in their core supporter groups while risk-loving candidates invest more in swing 
voters. On the other hand, Lindbeck and Weibull (1987) view voters and the political office-
seekers as two self-interested and maximising agents who interact in the political system. Given 
the nonsymmetric reaction to transfers and taxes, and that transfers can be targeted at a specific 
group, Linbeck-Weibull hypothesises that electoral candidates will target large transfers at swing 
voters.  
Building on the previous models, Dixit and Londregan (1996) show that, under a majority 
voting with two competing parties, if the parties are efficient in targeting transfers at any group, 
                                               
short-run Phillips curve to boost their re-election prospects. Unemployment and inflation are therefore 
subject to cyclical fluctuations according to the electoral cycles. See Dubois (2016) and Veiga et al. (2019) 
for surveys.  
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the model explains the swing voter theory; but, if parties are only effective in delivering targeted 
transfers to their core support group, the model explains the core constituency theory. Dixit and 
Londregan (1998) offer an additional explanation. They argue that parties adjust their 
ideological positions to take care of both ideological and pork-barrel components of their public 
policies to attract the swing voter groups whose cut-points change in response to redistribution 
promises targeted at them.  
The number of empirical studies analyzing the political economy of intergovernmental 
transfers is extensive, but most papers focus on the U.S. or Western European countries. Most 
studies find evidence supporting political budget cycles models; that is, that the central 
government increases transfers at election periods to boost its re-election chances. However, 
evidence on whether the allocation of transfers is skewed in favour of jurisdictions which give 
the incumbent the strongest support at the election or to those with more swing voters is 
mixed.3  
 Even though political influences on fiscal policy are more salient in young democracies 
where institutions are weaker, incumbent politicians can extract larger rents while in office and 
voters are less informed, only a few studies focus on developing countries. For Latin American 
countries, which initialized their democratization and decentralization processes mostly during 
the 1980s and 1990s, only the cases of Argentina (Porto & Sanguinetti, 2001), Mexico (Costa-i-
Fonta et al., 2003) and Brazil (Brollo & Nannicini, 2012) have been analyzed. In Asia, only India, 
                                               
3 Results depend on the specific features of each country, namely the electoral system and the 
institutional rules for the allocation of intergovernmental transfers. For studies on developed countries, 
see among others, Dalhberg and Johansson (2002), Johansson (2003), Akhmedov and Zhuravskaya (2004), 
Ansolabehere and Snyder, Jr (2006), Veiga and Pinho’s (2007), Sollé-Ollé (2013), Veiga and Veiga (2013), 
Simón-Casano et al. (2014), and Kauder et al. (2016). 
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which has a long-established democracy (Arulampalam et al., 2009) and Indonesia (Gerrit et al., 
2018) have been researched. There is also a gap in the literature regarding African countries.  
Several African developing countries recently embraced decentralisation reforms after 
years of colonial rule and long civil wars. An increase in the number of multiparty systems, and 
the pressure from regional and ethnic groups for more autonomy have increased the demand 
for decentralization. To eliminate political targeting and ward off its institutional weakening 
effects in intergovernmental transfers, many countries have evolved a formula-based system of 
intergovernmental transfers under an institutional manager.4 Despite the appealing 
characteristics of African countries for research, only three studies have been conducted to 
examine the impact of these institutional mechanisms in limiting political manipulation in 
intergovernmental transfers. For Ghana (Banful, 2011), Tanzania (Allers & Ishemoi, 2011) and 
Senegal (Caldeira, 2012) there is evidence that the formula-based intergovernmental transfer 
mechanisms did not eliminate politically motivated targeting in intergovernmental transfers. In 
this paper, we focus on the Nigerian case.  
 
3. Intergovernmental transfers in Nigeria 
This section presents some background information on the political and institutional features of 
the Nigerian fiscal federalism. 
 
3.1 Institutional foundation of the Nigerian intergovernmental transfers 
The Nigerian state is constitutionally a multiparty presidential federal democracy.5 The federal 
system of government entails multiple governmental jurisdictions under the same sovereign 
                                               
4 See Khemani (2007). 
5 At independence, Nigeria ran a parliamentary system of government until the army took over in 1966. 
The presidential system of the American type was introduced at the beginning of the second republic in 
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authority where powers and authorities are shared among various jurisdictions that make up 
the state.6 The federal system of government which emerged from the amalgamation of 
different geopolitical entities has been in place before the Nigeria’s independence in 1960, albeit 
with various modifications. At independence, the Nigerian federal system of government 
comprised the central (federal) government and three regions at the subnational level. 
However, the Nigerian geopolitical structures have undergone many changes until 1996 when 
the last major changes to the second administrative level (state) of the federal structure were 
made. The Nigerian federal system of government currently embraces a three-level system of 
federalism: the central government, state governments,7 and local governments. The 1999 
federal Constitution, which was adopted after the last modification to the federal structures, 
recognises the central government, 36 autonomous states, a semi-autonomous Federal Capital 
Territory (FCT), Abuja and 774 local governments.8  
 The Nigerian Constitution specifies the functions as well as the revenue-generating 
powers and sources of revenues for each level of governments in Nigeria. These functions, 
powers, and revenue sources have also undergone many changes. They change according to 
political developments, particularly when there is a change in the Constitution of the country. 
These functions which require the assignment of expenditures responsibilities are enshrined in 
the Nigerian 1999 Constitution. Statutorily, all revenues realised by the federal government, 
                                               
1979. Its operation continues in the fourth republic, which began in 1999 under the 1999 Federal 
Constitution. 
6 See Gómez-Reino and Martinez-Vazquez (2013) on fiscal decentralisation across the globe. 
7 The regional system was in place pre-and post-independence in Nigeria until 1967 when the regions 
were replaced by states. 
8 See Table A1 in the Appendix for a summary of the number of governments in each layer of government, 
since 1960. 
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after deduction of costs, are paid into the federation account9 as stipulated in Section 162(1) of 
the 1999 Constitution. The federal government receives the largest chunk of revenues according 
to the extant vertical sharing formula of 52.68%, 26.72% and 20.60% for the federal, state and 
local governments respectively. This formula has been in existence since the year 2004 against 
the constitutional provisions which underscores the influence of politics over institutions in 
intergovernmental revenue allocation (Khemani, 2007). Other statutory allocations must be 
made before the balance in the federation account is shared. These include the 13 percent 
derivation funds which are deducted from revenues realised from the production of mineral 
resources that are economically profitable to be shared by states from which those resources 
are sourced.10  
Revenue sharing is a highly contentious issue in Nigeria’s federalism.11 This has 
necessitated the use of a formula-based system of revenue allocation, and the constitution of 
an institutional body to oversee this arrangement. Before and under the present institutional 
                                               
9 The federation account is a metamorphosis of what was recommended as “Distributable Pool Account” 
in the pre-independent Raisman Commission’s Report of 1958. Certain revenues of the federal 
government are exempted from this provision such as the personal income tax (PIT) of the personnel of 
the armed forces, the police, the ministry of foreign affairs, and the residents of the FCT, Abuja. The 
revenue in the federation account is shared by the Federal Account Allocation Committee (FAAC) 
whenever fund is to be shared among tiers of government. 
10 The term mineral producing state is used here because the derivation principle in no longer limited to 
oil resources, it now includes other minerals that are economically profitable. 
11 Various commissions’ reports and constitutions before and after independence document issues on the 
Nigerian fiscal federalism. The literature on fiscal federalism in Nigeria, such as Adamolekun (2005) and 
Phillips (1971, 1999), is replete with contentious issues of the Nigerian federalism. The focus here is to 
find out if there is an element of political targeting in federal finance in Nigeria, despite the formula-based 
revenue allocation system.  
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body, Revenue Mobilization Allocation and Fiscal Commission (RMAFC), many vertical sharing 
formulae have been evolved to placate ethnic groups on revenue allocation.12 The existence of 
vertical allocation requires a sharing formula for the horizontal revenue allocation particularly 
in a multi-ethnic society like Nigeria where there are mistrust and moral hazard on revenue 
issues. This arises out of the ways and manners the federal government has handled revenue 
allocation. This is reflected in the variables that make up the horizontal revenue allocation 
formula which has not changed since the return to civil rule in the year 1999.13 Equality 
determines a large chunk (40%) of what is transferred to states in revenues from the federal 
government any time revenue is shared.14 This leads to less than optimal allocations with 
concomitant ills under the federal arrangement such as tax exporting, moral hazard, and debts. 
Notwithstanding the revenue allocation through the formula-based system, there are 
sections of the Constitution that spelt out support to the subnational governments. Specifically, 
Section 164 of the 1999 Constitution stipulates support to subnational governments in the form 
of transfers in aids with no definite formula for the transfers. By and large, the allocation of 
transfers of this nature based on the whims and caprices of the government at the centre makes 
it amenable to political targeting. Besides, under Chapter II of the 1999 Constitution which is 
codenamed Fundamental Objectives and Directives Principles of State Policy, the federal 
government has a few justifications to target a particular section of the country through porks 
                                               
12 See Table A2 in the Appendix for a description of the vertical revenue allocation formulae in Nigeria, 
since 1981. 
13 Since the return to the civil rule in 1999 after the 1999 general election, general elections have been 
held in 2003, 2007, 2011, 2015. However, some states like Anambra, Bayelsa, Edo, Ekiti, Kogi, Ondo, and 
Osun have their gubernatorial elections outside the general election dates because of the Supreme 
Court’s rulings on gubernatorial electoral disputes in those states. 
14 See Table 3A in the Appendix. 
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for political purposes. Section 16 (2) (b) under Chapter II states “that the material resources of 
the nation are harnessed and distributed as best as possible to serve the common good.” This 
section makes it possible for discretionary allocations for a government at the centre to provide 
pork barrels in support of its political base or a pivotal jurisdiction which may be hard to be 
labelled as such by the opposition.  
 
3.2 The revenue mobilisation, allocation and fiscal commission (RMAFC) 
Until 1988, various commissions and committees advised the Nigerian government on revenue 
allocation.15 In 1988, the RMAFC was established as a permanent body to advise the federal 
government based on the prevailing situation on revenue allocation. The formalisation of the 
establishment of the commission through an act was made in December 1989. This body is also 
recognised by the Nigerian 1999 Constitution. According to the Constitution, this body 
comprises a chairman, and other members representing each state of the federation and the 
semi-autonomous FCT, Abuja who are all appointees of the president, subject to the approval 
of the Senate. Inter alia, the commission is to track the accruals into and outlays of revenues 
from the federation account. The commission is also charged with the review of the existing 
revenue allocation formula and principles in line with economic developments subject to a 
provision that the extant revenue allocation formula has remained in operation for at least five 
years. The body also has to advise governments at all levels in the federation on fiscal efficiency 
and how to improve their revenues. All these functions are to be performed without political 
interference as an independent body.  
However, in practice, the work of the RMAFC may be affected by interest groups in 
government and its recommendations may be rejected due to political motives rather than 
sound economic judgement. The recommended vertical allocation formulae for 1989 and 1991 
                                               
15 Recall footnote 11. 
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by the RMAFC were not adopted.16 This underscores the subsidiarity of the power of the 
commission to political forces. Given the judgement of April 5, 2002, by the Supreme Court of 
Nigeria which nullified the extant vertical revenue allocation formula at the time, an allocation 
formula recommended by RMAFC should have been forwarded to the national assembly for 
adoption in line with the 1999 Constitution. The Supreme Court’s judgement altered the vertical 
revenue allocation formula in operation in conformity with the Nigerian 1999 Constitution as 
against the practice by the executive since the beginning of the fourth republic17 in the year 
1999.18 The nullification resulted in the issuance of an executive order based on the discretion 
of the executive in power instead of the constitutional provisions. This led to the emergence of 
three different vertical allocation formulae within two years; two in the year 2002, and the last 
one in the year 2004 (Table 2A).  
The politics behinds these orders have led to the violation of the Constitution on the 
review of the revenue allocation formula. The bickering between the federal and the state 
governments on the one hand, and among the state governments on the other hand over the 
vertical and horizontal allocation formulae respectively has almost rendered the RMAFC 
impotent. What has always resulted in a crisis between the central government and subnational 
governments is the way the federal government manages the common pool. In particular, the 
special funds19 in the vertical allocation formula have always been managed by the federal 
government until 2002. The subnational governments always suspect the central government 
                                               
16 See columns 4 and 6 of Table A2. 
17 The fourth republic commenced on May 29, 1999. 
18 The judgement given by the Supreme Court frowned at certain practices of the Federal Government in 
respect of funds in the federation account, and the non-implementation of the 13 per cent derivation 
principle as stated in the 1999 Constitution on revenues from natural resources.   
19 See Table A2 for various allocations to special funds under various vertical formulae. 
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in its ways and manners of managing these funds. The formulae that have been evolved over 
the years have been based on political rather than economic reasons. The result is that some 
states regardless of their economic potentials continue to depend on allocation from the centre, 
which makes them amenable to the federal government’s control. 
 
4. Methodology and data 
This section starts by discussing the empirical models and the estimation strategy adopted in 
the empirical work. It then presents the sources of the data and the descriptive statistics.  
 
4.1 Empirical models and estimation strategy 
In testing the political economy of intergovernmental transfer in Nigeria, our model relates the 
annual per capita intergovernmental transfer to a state as a dependent variable to vectors of 
normative, political and institutional, and control variables. The baseline model is presented in 
equation 1. 
 !"#$%&'"%() = +,-".#/01'()23 +	67-89$%/() + :( +	;) + <()																																								(1) 0 = 1,… , 36, / = 2007,… ,2016 
where 0 indexes a state and	/ represents a year.  
The dependent variable, Transfers, is defined in real per capita local currency (naira) to 
control for the differences in the size of the states both in geographical and economic terms and 
to avoid heteroskedasticity problems. Normative is a vector of variables proxying the economic, 
demographic and educational situation of the states. All variables included in this vector are 
lagged one period because intergovernmental transfers are decided one year before they are 
transferred to sub-national governments. PolInst is a vector of dummy variables representing 
political and institutional factors. hi is the individual effect and gt is time effects. +	and	6 are 
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vectors of parameters to be estimated, h and g are parameters to be estimated, and <()  is the 
error term.  
In public finance theory, according to the AMS perspective, normative factors determine 
intergovernmental transfers to any level of government for the objective of welfare 
maximisation. The vector of normative variables includes economic, demographic and education 
variables, namely the real per capita own revenues generated by each state (Own revenues), a 
proxy for GDP per capita based on night-lights (Luminosity), the amount granted in loan per 
capita to farmers in each state under the Agricultural Credit Guarantee Scheme Fund of the 
Central Bank of Nigeria (Agricultural loans), the number of persons per square kilometer 
(Population density) and dummies to identify mineral-producing states (MPS) and educationally 
developed states (EDS).20 The vector of political and institutional variables includes dummy 
variables to identify election years (Election year) and states run by governors that do not belong 
to parties in the federal government (Opposition) or that are prevented by law from running for 
office again (Term limit).    
Given that one of the normative objectives of intergovernmental transfers is to reduce 
horizontal inequalities among jurisdictions, the estimated coefficients associated with the 
variables Own revenues and Luminosity are expected to be negative. The amount of loans per 
capita granted to farmers is used as a proxy for rural and less developed states and, therefore, 
a positive sign is expected for the estimated coefficient associated with the variable Agricultural 
loans. From an economic perspective, we expect the estimated coefficient associated with the 
                                               
20 According to the Joint Admission and Matriculation Board (JAMB), states in Nigeria are categorised 
according to their level of educational development for the purpose of admission to schools, especially at 
tertiary level. Of the 36 states in Nigeria, 23 are categorised as Educationally Less Developed States (ELDS): 
Adamawa, Bauchi, Bayelsa, Benue, Borno, Cross Rivers, Ebonyi, Gombe, Jigawa, Kaduna, Kano, Kastina, 
Kebbi, Kogi, Kwara, Nassarawa, Niger, Plateau, Rivers, Sokoto, Taraba, Yobe, and Zamfara. 
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dummy for mineral producing states (MPS) to be negative since these states are richer than the 
others, particularly due to oil revenues. As explained in section 3.1, states from which minreal 
resources are sourced enjoy a 13 percent derivation allocation which is deducted from revenues 
realised from the production of mineral resources that are economically profitable. However, 
the South-South region of Nigeria where oil is produced has threatened secession over oil 
revenues many times. Thus, it is also possible that control over the mineral resources of the 
country provides these states additional political bargaining power to demand more transfers. 
In this case, a positive sign would be expected for the estimated coefficient. Regarding 
population density, a positive or a negative sign can be expected. A higher level of population 
density may allow for economies of scale in the provision of local public goods which is a 
rationale for a negative relationship between per capita transfers and population density. 
However, after a certain level, an increase in population density may generate diseconomies of 
scale, particularly in states with large urban areas, justifying a positive sign for the estimated 
coefficient associated with Population density. 
To test if political and institutional considerations matter for intergovernmental 
allocation to state governments in Nigeria, several variables were included in the model. 
Following the political business cycle theory (Rogoff & Sibert, 1988; Shi & Svensson, 2006), a 
dummy variable was included to signal general election years and gubernatorial elections that 
fall outside the general election years (Election year).21 To analyze if the federal government 
targets its core supporters or swing voters (Cox & McCubbins, 1986; Lindbeck & Weibull, 1987), 
                                               
21 Recall that political parties compete keenly for gubernatorial elections outside the general election 
periods. This was visible in the contest for the control of Ekiti State in the 2014 gubernatorial election 
between the party in power at the centre and the incumbent regional party in the state. The party in 
power at the centre muscled its influence around its candidate to gain an inroad into the regional block 
of South-West.   
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a dummy variable coded one for states being ruled by parties different from the party ruling at 
the federal level (Opposition) is considered.22 To test if term-limited governors are penalized in 
the allocation of transfers, a dummy variable identifying states whose governors are 
constitutionally not allowed to seek re-election again was also included (Term limit).23 Finally, to 
control for the passage of time, dummies for each mandate are included. There are three 
general elections in the periods under study, a dummy is created for each mandate. 
We start by estimating the model (equation 1) by ordinary least squares (OLS) and 
Random Effects (RE). Because transfers to a state may be affected by unobservable features that 
are not susceptible to change over time, we also estimate the model by Fixed Effects (FE). A 
Hausman test is implemented to select between the models. To correct for possible 
autocorrelation problems and obtain efficient and consistent estimates, we use robust standard 
errors clustered by states. Although the use of robust standard errors clustered by states 
corrects for possible autocorrelation problems, we also implement a slightly different model 
(equation 2) that includes the first lag of Transfers as an explanatory variable. This robustness 
test also allows us to analyze the degree of persistency in transfers over time. 
 !"#$%&'"%() = J!"#$%&'"%()23 + +,-".#/01'() +	67-89$%/() + 	:( +	;) + <()																	(2) 0 = 1, . . … , ,, / = 1,… . . . . , ! 
 
                                               
22 Under President Olusegun Obasanjo, Lagos State, under the control of an opposition party was denied 
allocations for many months for various political reasons. 
23 Governors facing term limits are sometimes denied some funds. Towards the end of 2016, part of the 
Paris Club refund to Ondo State was not released because the outgoing opposition party governor was 
expected to be succeeded by a member of the party ruling at the centre. 
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Equation 2 is also estimated by OLS, RE and FE. The latter assumes individual-specific 
effects which capture both observable and unobservable time-invariant differences across 
states. However, because the model is dynamic, by construction the lagged dependent variable 
is correlated with the individual effect (hi), which leads to spurious estimates. According to 
Arellano and Bond (1991), this problem can be overcome by taking first-differences of equation 
(2) to eliminate the individual effects and using as instruments for the first lag of the dependent 
variables lagged levels of the dependent variable from two or more periods before. Since 
transfers are expected to be highly persistent the System GMM (SGMM) estimation is 
implemented, as suggested by Arellano and Bover (1995) and Blundell and Bond (1998). The 
validity of the instruments used is checked using the Hansen test for over-identifying restriction. 
Arellano-Bond tests for first- and second-order serial correlation in disturbances are employed. 
The first-order serial correlation is expected (due to the lagged dependent term) and should not 
be a problem. The study follows the suggestions of Roodman (2009a & 2009b) in handling the 
estimation strategy to address the problem of too many instruments.  
 
4.2 Sources of data and descriptive statistics 
The study explores panel data that covers the year 2007 to the year 2016. The data on 
Transfers is available for both net and gross allocation to states. The net transfer allocation is 
what states get after their indebtedness that the federal government guaranteed (including 
amount due in a joint project with the federal government) has been deducted from the gross 
allocation.24 For both net and gross allocations, the 13 percent derivation allocation from 
                                               
24 Given that subnational governments have limited capacity to commit to international borrowings due 
to possible default that may affect national credit rating, the federal government acts to protect the 
nation and creditors by always guaranteeing repayments of loans taken from foreign institutions. The 
repayment of debts may also be in respect of other financial commitments and obligations either locally 
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revenues from mineral resources is deducted from the transfers to states that are entitled to it. 
This is done to eliminate biasedness as this can confound the relationship between Own revenue 
and Transfers. All monetary variables are in the local currency; and, they are adjusted for change 
in the time value of money using the composite consumer price index (CCPI).  
For Nigeria, like for most developing countries, data on subnational jurisdictions’ 
economic activities is scarce. Even when data is available, it is frequently poorly measured, 
namely due to high levels of informality that prevail in developing countries. Following Chen and 
Nordhaus (2011) and Henderson et al. (2011, 2012) the brightness of visible night-lights from 
the space is adopted to proxy the Nigerian states’ GDP. The original data is collected from NASA 
and the average of stable nighttime lights25 (multiplied by 1,000,000) is divided by the number 
of inhabitants. The resulting variable, termed Luminosity, is used as a proxy of GDP per capita. 
Data for luminosity is only available from 2007 to 2013 and was interpolated for the last three 
years of the sample.26 Two dummy variables, MPS and EDS respectively identify oil-producing 
states and educationally developed states. 
The full summary statistics of the data and sources are displayed in Table 1. The data is 
sourced from the National Bureau of Statistics (NBS), the Central Bank of Nigeria (CBN), the 
Independent National Electoral Commission (INEC) and the Joint Admission and Matriculation 
Board (JAMB). JTB stands for the Joint Tax Board and OAGF refers to the Office of the Accountant 
General of the Federation. The number of observations is 357, the number of states is 36, and 
the number of years is 10. Transfers, Own revenues and Agricultural loans are in real per capita 
terms. Population density is the number of persons per square kilometer. 
                                               
or internationally. The federal government deducts at the source the value of due repayment obligations 
from the amount states are entitled to in intergovernmental transfers.  
25 Original data is presented in digital numbers from 0 to 63, as annual figures. 
26 This is done using ipolate command in STATA 15 (StataCorp, 2017). 
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Table 1: Descriptive statistics for the years 2007-2016 
Variable          Mean Std. Dev. Min Max Source 
Net transfers                                         9,661.95 5,525.95 647.67 57,234.86 NBS, OAGF 
Gross transfers 10,480.79 5,842.72 2,171.15 57,307.94 NBS, OAGF 
Own revenues                                               2,000.58 2,803.20 120.27 19,492.75 NBS, JTB 
Luminosity 0.64 1.07 0.01 8.18 NASA 
Agricultural loans                               46.74 43.78 0.00 276.41 CBN 
Population density                            355.30 489.56 40.77 3,311.18 NBS 
EDS 0.36  0 1 JAMB 
MPS 0.25  0 1 NBS 
Opposition                                                   0.34  0 1 INEC 
Election year                                                0.34  0 1 INEC 
Term limit                                                     0.14  0 1 INEC 
Notes: EDS refers to Educationally developed states. MPS represents Mineral-producing states.  
 
5. Empirical results 
This section presents the estimation results of the static and dynamic panel data models, 
described by equations (1) and (2). The dependent variable is net transfers from the federal 
government to states, from 2007 to 2016. This section also describes the robustness tests 
implemented to determine the consistency of the previous results.  
 
5.1. The static model 
We start by analyzing the allocation of net transfers to states. The empirical model of equation 
1 is estimated without the time-invariant dummies for educationally developed states (EDS) and 
mineral-producing states (MPS). Results of econometric estimations by Ordinary Least Squares 
(OLS), Random Effects (RE) and Fixed Effects (FE) are presented in Table 2. The Breusch-Pagan 
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Lagrangian Multiplier test affirms the consistency and efficiency of RE over OLS indicating that 
there is a panel effect with a chi-square statistic of 64.38 at one percent level of significance. 
The Hausman test indicates that the individual component of the error term is not correlated 
with the regressors with a Chi-squared statistic of 9.91 and a p-value of 0.35. With this, RE is 
efficient and consistent with a between R-squared of 54 percent explaining variation in Transfers 
and a Rho of 0.28 indicating that 28 percent of the variation is due to differences across panels. 
The Wald statistic of RE estimator indicates a good model with a Chi-squared statistic of 1337.5 
for the rejection of the null at one percent level of significance. Therefore, when interpreting 
the results, we focus on the RE estimations presented in column 2. 
 
Table 2: The political economy of intergovernmental net transfers 
Variable OLS RE FE RE 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
Own revenue(t-1) 0.3376* 0.1172 -0.3671 0.1175 
 (0.1724) (0.2514) (0.5563) (0.2568) 
Luminosity(t-1) 2.1304*** 2.1139*** 1.5505 2.1134*** 
 (0.2324) (0.3145) (0.9693) (0.3206) 
Agricultural loans(t-1) -0.0112* -0.0119** -0.0109** -0.0120** 
 (0.0063) (0.0053) (0.0050) (0.0053) 
Population density(t-1) -0.0038*** -0.0027** -0.0066 -0.0027** 
 (0.0010) (0.0013) (0.0071) (0.0013) 
Opposition -1.2592* -1.7073*** -1.9205*** -1.7403*** 
 (0.6449) (0.5365) (0.6150) (0.5336) 
Election year 2.0232*** 2.0399*** 2.0841*** 1.9147** 
 (0.5873) (0.6130) (0.7097) (0.8221) 
Term limit -0.9771* -0.7825* -0.6381 -0.9045 
 (0.5591) (0.4669) (0.4843) (0.6380) 
Term limit*Election Year    0.3751 
    (0.7727) 
R-squared 0.55 0.54 0.55 0.54 
Rho  0.28 0.62 0.29 
BP LM test stat  64.38***  70.44*** 
Hausman test   9.91  
Notes: Significance levels: * 10%, ** 5%, *** 1%. Clustered standard errors at the state level are in 
parentheses. The dependent variable is the net transfer per capita. Results are estimates of equation (1). 
BP LM test refers to the Breusch-Pagan Lagrangian Multiplier statistic. The number of observations is 322 
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for all regressions. To control for the passage of time, dummies for each mandate are included in all 
regressions. 
 
As can be seen from column 2, among the normative variables considered, only Own 
revenue is not statistically significant. The proxy for states’ GDP per capita (Luminosity) is highly 
statistically significant but, contrary to our expectation, is positively correlated with transfers. 
This reveals that richer states receive more transfers per capita from the federal government 
than poor states, suggesting that intergovernmental transfers are not being used to promote 
equity among states. This is easily discernible in the case of Nigeria as equality accounts for the 
highest proportion of transfers to states. The amount of loans per capita granted to farmers 
(Agricultural loans) is negatively signed and statistically significant. Again, the sign of the 
estimated coefficient does not conform to our expectations since it indicates that rural states 
are penalized in the distribution of transfers. Finally, Population density is highly statistically 
significant and negatively correlated with transfers. Admitting that a higher level of population 
density generates economies of scale in the provision of local public goods, the negative 
relationship between per capita transfers and population density is in line with public finance 
theory. 
 All the three political and institutional variables considered, turned out to be statistically 
significant and signed according to our expectations. States ruled by governors that do not 
belong to parties in the federal government are penalized in the distribution of funds. 
Intergovernmental transfers seem to be tactically distributed in favour of core supporter 
constituencies among states in Nigeria. The Election year dummy variable is also consistently 
positive and strongly statistically significant under all the three estimators. At the Election year, 
there appear to be more strategic transfers to states. This may be an attempt at buying support 
from the subnational level as the probability of re-election of any incumbent president at the 
federal level rests on the level of support from the subnational units. Finally, Term limit is 
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negatively signed and marginally statistically significant. The sign is in line with our expectations, 
implying that states whose governors face a term limit are penalized by receiving fewer 
transfers. This may be a strategic decision for the party that is ruling at the center. It may also 
signal lower effort to attract transfers by governors prevented from running for re-election 
again. To test if states with term-limited governors are treated differently at election years, we 
introduced in the regression a variable resulting from the interaction of the Term limit and the 
Election year dummies. As can be seen from column 4 of Table 2, the interaction variable did 
not turn out as statistically significant.   
In Table 3, two time-invariants dummy variables that identify educationally developed 
states and mineral-producing states are introduced into the model but did not turn out as 
statistically significant (column 1). To check the robustness of the results and because the 
dummy variable MPS is correlated with Luminosity (61%), we excluded Luminosity from the 
regression. As can be seen from column 2, the dummy for mineral-producing states is now 
strongly statistically significant and positively signed, indicating that these states receive more 
transfers. Higher transfers being enjoyed by the mineral-producing states are in line with the 
submission of the credible threat of secession in a federation by Treisman (1996). The South-
South region of Nigeria where oil is produced has threatened succession over oil revenues many 
times. For this, they are not only enjoying the 13 percent derivation allocation, but they seem 
to be specially treated in the allocation of transfers. Given this result, we then interacted the 
dummy variable MPS with the three political and institutional variables analyzed. There is 
evidence that oil-producing states ruled by governors that are not politically aligned with the 
federal government receive fewer transfers than those that are aligned (column 3). A similar 
result was obtained for states whose governors are term-limited (column 4). Finally, at election 
years, no discrimination is made by the federal government in favor of oil-producing states; that 
is, all states benefit from an increase in transfers (column 5).    
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Table 3: The political economy of intergovernmental net transfers 
Variable RE RE RE RE RE 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
Own revenue(t-1) 0.0561 0.0828 0.0359 0.1837 0.0791 
 (0.2718) (0.2866) (0.2701) (0.2860) (0.2936) 
Luminosity(t-1) 1.7736***     
 (0.4311)     
Agricultural loans(t-1) -0.0119** -0.0121** -0.0123** -0.0110** -0.0121** 
 (0.0053) (0.0055) (0.0053) (0.0051) (0.0056) 
Population density(t-1) -0.0019 -0.0006 -0.0007 -0.0013 -0.0006 
 (0.0016) (0.0018) (0.0017) (0.0018) (0.0018) 
Opposition -1.7356*** -2.0136*** 0.0058 -2.0054*** -2.0152*** 
 (0.6274) (0.7072) (0.3691) (0.7027) (0.7134) 
Election year 2.1041*** 2.3477*** 2.2891*** 2.1613*** 2.3624*** 
 (0.6374) (0.7384) (0.6902) (0.7616) (0.4563) 
Term limit -0.8378* -0.9983** -0.7798* -0.1067 -0.9932** 
 (0.4779) (0.4769) (0.4238) (0.3320) (0.4819) 
EDS -0.9963 -1.4165 -1.4052 -1.0841 -1.4161 
 (0.9776) (1.3299) (1.2253) (1.3350) (1.3294) 
MPS 1.8832 4.7198*** 7.4804*** 5.6447*** 4.7412*** 
 (1.2084) (1.6102) (2.2937) (1.6444) (1.3671) 
MPS* Opposition   -6.2499***   
   (2.0554)   
MPS* Term limit    -3.3807**  
    (1.3328)  
MPS* Election year     -0.0600 
     (1.5249) 
R-squared 0.56 0.39 0.51 0.39 0.39 
Notes: Significance levels: * 10%, ** 5%, *** 1%. Clustered standard errors at the state level are in 
parentheses. The dependent variable is the net transfer per capita. Results are estimates of equation (1) 
using RE estimator. EDS refers to Educationally developed states. MPS represents Mineral-producing 
states. The number of observations is 322 for all regressions. To control for the passage of time, dummies 
for each mandate are included in all regressions. 
 
5.2 The dynamic model 
As explained in section 4.1, although we use robust standard errors clustered by states 
to correct for possible auto-correlation problems, we also implement an econometric model 
that includes the first lag of the dependent variable in the set of regressors (equation 2). This 
procedure allows us to analyze the degree of persistency in transfers over time. We start by 
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estimating the model by OLS, FE and RE with the same set of explanatory variables to facilitate 
comparisons. As can be seen from Table 4, the first lag of the dependent variable is always 
statistically significant and positively signed, confirming that there is persistency over time in 
intergovernmental allocations. The Hausman test indicates that a fixed-effects model is 
preferable to a random-effects model. Since our model is dynamic and the dependent variable 
is persistent over time, the SGMM estimation procedure is implemented and, therefore we 
focus our attention on the estimation results resulting from this econometric procedure (column 
4). For the level equation, the lagged first difference of the dependent variable is used as 
instrument for the lagged dependent variable. For the differenced equation, the first-difference 
of the dependent variable is instrumented by its levels lagged 2 and 3 years. Own revenues, 
Luminosity, Agricultural loans, Population density and Opposition are assumed to be 
endogenous and are instrumented similarly to lagged transfers. The remaining explanatory 
variables, Election year and Term limit are assumed as exogenous. Lags 2 and 3 of these 
independent variables are used as their own instruments, while the year and state dummies are 
used as IV-style instruments. The number of instruments used in the estimation is reported at 
the bottom of the table, as well as the p-values for AR1 and AR2 tests for serial correlation, and 
the p-value for the Hansen test for over-identifying restrictions. For the SGMM, the two-step 
estimation with the finite-sample correction for standard errors suggested by Windmeijer 
(2005) is used. 
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Table 4: The political economy of intergovernmental net transfers: equation 2 
Variable OLS RE FE SGMM 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
Transfer (t-1) 0.5794*** 0.5794*** 0.3621*** 0.3710*** 
 (0.0808) (0.0808) (0.0378) (0.0722) 
Own revenue 0.1310 0.1310* -0.3447 -0.0296 
 (0.0783) (0.0783) (0.5353) (0.2726) 
Luminosity 0.6761*** 0.6761*** 0.6867 1.9824*** 
 (0.2124) (0.2124) (0.8880) (0.4972) 
Agricultural loans -0.0078** -0.0078** -0.0102** -0.0242* 
 (0.0037) (0.0037) (0.0046) (0.0136) 
Population density -0.0013*** -0.0013*** -0.0061 -0.0017 
 (0.0004) (0.0004) (0.0055) (0.0015) 
Opposition -0.7901** -0.7901** -1.4482*** -2.6715** 
 (0.3249) (0.3249) (0.4687) (1.1039) 
Election year 1.7625** 1.7625*** 1.9277** 1.8029*** 
 (0.6809) (0.6809) (0.7394) (0.4858) 
Term limit -0.7216** -0.7216*** -0.6293* -0.5847 
 (0.2738) (0.2738) (0.3614) (0.4483) 
R-squared 0.70 0.95 0.60  
Hausman test   39.72***  
AR1 (p-value)    0.14 
AR2 (p-value)    0.05 
Hansen stat (p-value)    0.12 
No of instruments    36.00 
Notes: Significance levels: * 10%, ** 5%, *** 1%. Clustered standard errors at the state level are in 
parentheses. The dependent variable is the net transfer per capita. Results are estimates of equation (2) 
using various estimators. The number of observations is 322 for all regressions. To control for the passage 
of time, dummies for each mandate are included in all regressions. 
 
Results when using the SGMM procedure (column 4), confirm the result found in Table 
2 that states with a higher GDP per capita (Luminosity) receive more transfers, reinforcing our 
conclusion that intergovernmental transfers are not promoting equity among states. The results 
also show that states receiving larger amounts of agricultural loans receive fewer transfers, 
which also goes against our expectations. Regarding the political variables, there is evidence that 
opposition states are negatively discriminated against in the distribution of transfers; and that 
at electoral periods, more funds are allocated to states. When estimating the dynamic model by 
the SGMM, being a term-limited governor does not seem to influence the amount of transfers 
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received by the state. However, for all the three other econometric methods considered (OLS, 
RE and FE) the Term limit dummy is negatively signed and statistically significant, as in the 
estimates for the static model.  
 
5.3 Robustness tests 
What is due to a state is the gross allocation while the balance remaining after the 
deduction of due repayment obligation is the net allocation.27 The net allocations are used as 
the dependent variable in the main regressions. Given that the debt obligations (the gap 
between gross allocations and net allocations) may mask the politics inherent in 
intergovernmental transfers on the variables of interest, it thus becomes important to use the 
gross transfers as the dependent variable in checking the robustness of the main regressions’ 
results. The static and dynamic models of equations (1) and (2) are estimated using the same 
econometric techniques.28 The behaviour of the explanatory variables in the models using gross 
allocations data remains stable as under the main regressions.29 The coefficients of variables in 
our model show little or no change in magnitude and direction as results indicate in Tables 2-4. 
Therefore, the results are not driven by the data used in the econometric estimations. They 
confirm that Nigeria behaves like some other developing federal states where strategic 
considerations override normative reasons in revenue sharing. 
 
                                               
27 The difference in the gross allocation and net allocation has been explained earlier in section 4.2. The 
correlation between gross and net transfers per capita is 0.974. 
28 Virtually all the states had repayment obligations that were repayable during the periods covered in 
this study. So, using the gross allocations is a good approach to check the robustness of the results given 
that our panel data covers a short period (2007-2016). 
29 Results are available from the authors upon request. 
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6. Conclusion 
This study examines the existence of political targeting in intergovernmental transfers 
in Nigeria. Nigeria is a multiparty federal democracy. Though the normative theories of fiscal 
federalism recommend equity and efficiency for intergovernmental transfers, in practice, it has 
been established that politics influences the allocation of intergovernmental transfers. This has 
led to the establishment of mechanisms to remove the influence of politics in intergovernmental 
transfers through formulaic revenue sharing arrangement and establishment of an independent 
body to oversee the sharing of revenues. The extant practice in Nigeria conforms to the 
formulaic revenue sharing arrangement under the supervision of a constitutionally recognised 
independent body, RMAFC. The extant institutional arrangement evolves largely from an 
overused system of ad-hoc committees in response to constitutional and political developments 
for revenue sharing arrangement in Nigeria.  
Notwithstanding the extant practice, there is evidence of political targeting in 
intergovernmental transfers in Nigeria, as observed by Khemani (2007). Intergovernmental 
transfer does not conform to equity and efficiency considerations. The poorer states and states 
with greater fiscal needs are not favored in revenue sharing. There seems to be a grand political 
targeting under the formulaic revenue sharing arrangement being supervised by an independent 
body in Nigeria. Results point to the existence of distributive politics in intergovernmental 
transfers to support core supporter constituencies and the use of transfers to expand the 
political base. The existing system of intergovernmental transfers lends itself to political 
manipulations and makes the use of intergovernmental transfers for opportunism possible, 
especially when the president can override the constitutional body.  
Distributive allocation is done through large transfers to subnational governments 
around the election year (Rogoff & Sibert, 1988). Additionally, states under the control of the 
opposition party members get lower transfers than states in the hands of the core supporter 
constituencies of the party of the government at the centre (Cox & McCubbins, 1986; Dixit & 
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Londregan, 1996). More so, a state whose governor faces a term limit gets lower transfers. This 
may be in anticipation that a member of the party at the centre will emerge the new governor 
in the state. It may also signal less effort to attract funds by the incumbent governor since re-
election is not feasible.  
Higher transfers being enjoyed by the mineral-producing states are in line with the 
submission of the credible threat of secession in a federation by Treisman (1996). The South-
South region of Nigeria where oil is produced has threatened succession over oil revenues 
several times. The current large transfers to the region are a product of series of agitations and 
threats to secede from the Nigerian state. For this, they are not only enjoying the 13 percent 
derivation allocation, but they are also being specially treated as this study reveals.  
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Appendix A 
Table A1: The structural evolution of the Nigerian federalism, 1960-2016 
Year 1960* 1963* 1967 1970 1976 1979 1981 1984 1987 1991 1996 
Autonomous 
states 
3 
(regions) 
4 
(regions) 12 12 19 19 19 19 21 30 36 
Semi-
autonomous 
state 
- - - - - - - - - 1 1 
Local 
government 
areas 
- - - 299 299 301 781 301 449 593 774 
Notes: *Under the regional system, there was no uniform system of local government administration in 
Nigeria as each region had its system of local administration. Hence, the number of local government 
areas could not be ascertained. Until 1991, Lagos served as the seat of the Federal Government. Though 
FCT, Abuja was created in 1976, its semi-autonomous status came into force in 1991 when the Federal 
Capital was relocated from Lagos State to FCT, Abuja. Of the listed 774 local governments areas in Nigeria, 
six are municipal council areas in the semi-autonomous region of FCT, Abuja.  
Source: Akindele et al. (2002) and authors’ addition.  
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Table A2: The vertical revenue allocation formulae in Nigeria, 1981-2004 (in percentage, %) 
Recipient 1981 1984 1989(r) 1990 1991(r) 1992(b) 1992(c) 1999 2002(d) 2002(e) 2004 
Federal government 
   Special Funds 
1. Federal Capital Territory 
2. Stabilisation 
3. Derivation 
4. Dev. of mineral producing areas 
5. General Ecology 
6. Primary education fund 
7. Dev. of non-mineral producing areas 
8. Savings 
9. Dev. of natural resources 
State Governments 
Local Governments 
Total 
55 
4.5 
- 
- 
2 
1.5 
1 
- 
- 
- 
- 
30.5 
10 
100 
55 
2.5 
- 
- 
- 
1.5 
1 
- 
- 
- 
- 
32.5(a) 
10 
100 
47 
8 
1 
0.5 
2 
2 
0.5 
- 
0.5 
2 
- 
30 
15 
100 
50 
5 
1 
0.5 
1 
1.5 
1 
- 
- 
- 
- 
30 
15 
100 
47.5 
10 
1 
0.5 
1 
1.5 
1 
5 
- 
- 
- 
28.5 
14 
100 
50 
5 
1 
0.5 
1 
1.5 
1 
- 
- 
- 
- 
24 
20 
100 
48.5 
7.5 
1 
0.5 
1 
3 
2 
- 
- 
- 
- 
24 
20 
100 
48.5 
7.5 
1 
0.5 
1 
3 
2 
- 
- 
- 
- 
24 
20 
100 
56 
7.5 
1 
1.5 
- 
- 
2 
- 
- 
- 
3 
24 
20 
100 
54.68 
6.185 
1 
0.725 
- 
- 
1.46(f) 
- 
- 
- 
3 
24.72 
20.60 
100(g) 
52.68 
4.18 
1 
0.5 
- 
- 
1 
- 
- 
- 
1.68 
26.72 
20.60 
100 
Notes: (r) Vertical allocation formulae recommended by the RMAFC but these were not implemented. 
 (a) 2% of the mineral component of the entire 32.5% due to states from the federation account is to be shared based on the derivation principle. 
 (b), (c), (d), (e) Allocation formulae implemented by the federal government in January 1992, June 1992, May 2002, and July 2002. 
 (f) From July 2002, the special allocation becomes the federal government share of derivation and ecology.   
 (g) The total due to the federal government was approximated to 54.68%. Also, since May 2002, all the special allocations are part of the federal government’s share, 
and the formulae are based on executive orders. 
Source: Inyang (2013, p. 8), and authors compilation from official government documents. 
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Table A3: The current horizontal revenue sharing formula among states (%) 
The basis of sharing                                                                                   Percentage of the total fund 
 Equality:            40 
 Population:            30 
 Landmass and Terrain:           10 
 Landmass        5 
 Terrain         5 
 Social Development Factors:          10 
 Education        4 
  Primary school enrolment    2.4 
  Secondary/Commercial school enrolment  0.8 
  Inverse secondary/commercial school enrolment 0.8 
Health         3 
  Hospital beds      1.5 
  Hospital beds inverse proportion   1.5 
 Water         3 
  Water supply spread     1.5 
  Rainfall inverse proportion    1.5 
 Internal Revenue Effort:          10 
  Total          100 
Note: The variables in the table determine transfers allocation at a horizontal level in Nigeria. What each state 
of the federation gets is determined by the parameters defined in the table.  
Source: Authors’ compilation. 
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